I’m giving a talk on Wednesday, so please come along to that if you’re available. Details below.
Dear all,
This is to announce two talks on Wednesday 3rd May 12:00-13:00, in S4.29. Each talk will last ~20 minutes. Details for both talks can be found below.
Speaker: Dr Elizabeth Black
Title: Planning for persuasion (Elizabeth Black, Amanda Coles, Christopher Hampson)
Abstract:
We aim to find a winning strategy that determines the arguments a proponent should assert during a dialogue such that it will successfully persuade its opponent of some goal arguments, regardless of the strategy employed by the opponent. By restricting the
strategies we consider for the proponent to what we call simple strategies and by modelling this as a planning problem, we are able to use an automated planner to generate optimal simple strategies for realistically sized problems. These strategies guarantee
with a certain probability (determined by the proponent’s uncertain model of the arguments available to the opponent) that the proponent will be successful no matter which arguments the opponent chooses to assert. Our model accounts for the possibility that
the proponent, when asserting arguments, may give away knowledge that the opponent can subsequently use against it; we examine how this affects both time taken to find an optimal simple strategy and its probability of guaranteed success.
Speaker: David Marzagão
Title: Multi-Agent Flag Coordination Games (David Kohan Marzagão, Nicolás Rivera, Colin Cooper, Peter McBurney, Kathleen Steinhöfel)
Abstract:
Many multi-agent coordination problems can be understood as autonomous local choices between a finite set of options, with each local choice undertaken simultaneously without explicit coordination between decision-makers, and with a shared goal
of achieving a desired global state or states. Examples of such problems include classic consensus problems between nodes in a distributed computer network and the adoption of competing technology standards. We model such problems as a multi-round game between
agents having flags of different colours to represent the finite choice options, and all agents seeking to achieve global patterns of colours through a succession of local colour-selection choices.
We generalise and formalise the problem, proving results for the probabilities of achievement of common desired global states when these games are undertaken on bipartite graphs, extending known results for non-bipartite graphs. We also calculate probabilities
for the game entering infinite cycles of non-convergence. In addition, we present a game-theoretic approach to the problem that has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where two players can simultaneously flip the colour of one of the opponent's nodes in the
bipartite graph before or during a flag-coordination game.
RSVP: http://nms.kcl.ac.uk/ais/seminars/ais/seminars/events/attend/Nw%3D%3D
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Kind regards,
Josh